Texas National Security Review
Vol. 2, Issue 4 November 2019
On August 19, 1953 elements inside Iran organized and funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and British intelligence services carried out a coup d’etat that overthrew the government of prime minister Mohammed Moṣaddeq. Historians have yet to reach a consensus on why the Eisenhower Administration opted to use covert action in Iran, tending to either emphasize the American fear of communism or desire to control oil as the most important factors influencing the decision. Using recently declassified material, this article argues that growing fears of a “collapse” in Iran motivated the decision to remove Moṣaddeq.
April 23, 2019
A history of the United States, oil, and the rise of OPEC, for the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History.
‘WHAT THEY NEED IS MANAGEMENT:’ AMERICAN NGOS, THE SECOND SEVEN YEAR PLAN AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN, 1954-1963
International History Review 41:1
January 2, 2019
After the 1953 coup, U.S. aid and oil revenues poured into Iran. At the same time, non-government organizations (NGOs) tried to assist Iran's Plan Organization in its efforts to turn petroleum into progress. This article uses sources in English and Farsi to illustrate how U.S. development groups tried to bring Western expertise to Iran's development challenges, while simultaneously building a view of Iran affected by deep views of Iranian incapacity and inability to modernize.
IN SEARCH OF “EQUITABILITY”: SIR JOHN CADMAN, REZĀ SHAH AND THE CANCELLATION OF THE D’ARCY CONCESSION, 1928‒33
Iranian Studies 50:1
January 2, 2017
From the earliest days of the oil industry, international capital has waged a constant struggle against resource nationalism. In 1932, Iran's ruler Reza Shah cancelled the concession of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, throwing into question the entire basis of international contracts. This article explores how APOC's chairman John Cadman and Iran's shah negotiated a new contract in 1933, one that outwardly honored the principle of "equitability," while simultaneously preserving Western control over Iran's oil resources.
Mediterranean Quarterly 26:4 (Winter, 2015)
The Suez Crisis and the rise of Arab Nationalism brought about a sudden, seismic shift in U.S. Middle East policy. From an aloof position, the U.S. sought to stabilize the region, protect the flow of oil, and counteract the influence of Nasser by allying with local allies, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. But limitations on U.S. capabilities, the need to work with unreliable local partners and a weakened British ally, and the growing potency of nationalism ultimately upended the Eisenhower Doctrine, resulting in a strategic reverse for the United States by the end of 1958.